String theory is accused by some of its critics to be a purely abstract mathematical discipline, having lost the contact to the simple yet deeply rooted questions which physics provided until the beginning of this century. We argue that, in contrary, there are indications that string theory might be linked to a fundamental principle of a quantum computational character. In addition, the nature of this principle can possibly provide some new insight into the question of universality of string theory (string theory as the "theory of everything").
Universality
String theory is often also named the "theory of everything" since it is supposed to explain all the fundamental forces and all the elementary particles of nature, including the gravitational force which -as we know from Einstein's theory of general relativity -is intimately linked to the structure of space-time. But could it not be possible that the story goes on after string theory that we would discover e.g. additional new forces of nature which it does not explain? After all, even the early 20th century believed that electromagnetism and gravity are the only fundamental forces, the discovery of the weak and strong forces came only later since their presence is basically restricted to the level of elementary particles. This question is usually answered by refering to the Planck length. The weak and strong forces were discovered by investigating smaller distance scales than before but a quantum theory of gravity is supposed to provide a smallest length scale in the order of the Planck length and string theory is assumed to be valid down to this scale. Indeed, there are strong arguments that string theory involves such a minimum length, shorter length scales being physically non observable in the same sense as the Heisenberg uncertainty relation shows classical phase space coordinates to be non observable beyond a certain precision (There is a large body of work on this topic in string theory. In order to keep the list of references of this short letter restricted, we refer to [Pol] as a general reference for string theory and cite only individual research papers on very special topics not included there.). If we would have a theory which applies down to the Planck scale and if shorter length scales are physically unobservable, it seems that we would really have a final physical theory. A critic who is acquainted with string theory could try to find a loop hole in this argument by pointing out that string theorists themselves believe that the -yet to be discovered -fundamental formulation of the theory might not refer to space-time at all. So, maybe it is simply wrong to assume that gaining new knowledge will necessarily be linked to the necessity to increase space-time precision of measurements. Maybe a full fledged string theory would itself tell us how to pose the right questions ultimately leading beyond itself.
At this point, we should remember Bohr's discussion of measurement in quantum mechanics which in its basic ideas is applicable to any physical theory, including string theory. The starting point of the argument is that it does not make any sense to try to discuss the question what "physics is really like". We have to be content with investigating how physics which physicists can know about is like. But irrespective of how ingenious and inventive experimental physicists and high tech engineers will be in the future, any experiment will ultimately have to include some measuring device whichfor the purpose of the experiment under consideration -can be supposed to work according to the laws of classical mechanics. The finger pointing to the value of some measured quantity on a scale has to work as a classical device. If you would observe it in e.g. funny quantum superpositions, you would simply not be able to communicate about the results of the experiments with a colleague or to give a conference report about these. So, ultimately higher precision of an experiment has to transform into higher precision of a classical measuring device but, simply because it is a classical device, higher precision means higher precision in the space-time coordinates (e.g. of the finger on the scale). Of course, we can use different scales . We can observe the same effect on a, in total, smaller or larger scale but this is simply a rescaling. It does not prevent from the conclusion that if there is a limit to the increase of space-time precision, there is a limit to the precision of any kind of experiment which human physicists can perform.
So, the conviction that string theory is universal, in the sense that it is not itself the limiting case of yet another more fundamental theory to be dicovered one day by experiments of some very high precision, does not derive from lack of fantasy to imagine e.g. some new exotic forces of nature but from some very fundamental limits.
Can we really gain universal knowledge, even in principle? Of course, in practice string theory will not provide you with the possibility to calculate your success in the stock markets in advance. Since it adheres to the laws of quantum mechanics, string theory has even intrinsic bounds on the knowledge one can gain from it. But accepting the limits of Heisenberg's uncertainty relation and of practical calculations, the idea of having one day the final physical theory in our hands causes admiration and unease at the same time. And it is not the purely melancholic kind of unease ("the story is finally over, then") which arises, here, but an unease which is fostered by one of the deepest insights the 20th century has provided us with.
Since Gödel presented his incompleteness theorems, we know that universality can require a price to pay. Hilbert's program of building mathematics on formal axiomatics and proving that the used axiom systems are free of contradictions, then, would -if successful -also have given mathematics a final form. Indeed, in spite of Gödel's results, mathematics has found a base in the 20th century in the form of axiomatic set theory which has proved to be universal so far in the sense that any presently known field of mathematics can -in principle (again, this is often not the most useful view in mathematical practice) -be boiled down to constructions in this theory. The price Gödel's incompleteness theorems require us to pay for this is the never ending richness of models (in the sense of model theory of formal axiomatic systems) which axiomatic set theory has (and which -just by Gödel's results -no formal axiomatic theory whatever can come to terms with). It is the feeling that the Gödel results tell us a lesson about universality which goes beyond their concrete form as a result about formal axiomatic theories which causes the deeper form of unease one experiences when talking about the final physical theory.
Comparing to Gödel's results in formal mathematics, we expect that the final physical theory, the "theory of everything", comes along with an in-exhaustible plentitude of models (here, we use the term "inexhaustible" to stress that we do not simply mean infinitely many models but also that they can not be described in a single closed form). This expectation is not in contradiction to the limits on observations we discussed above. Our discussion of physical measurements above applies only to local properties. Strictly speaking, the conclusion we can draw from it is that for any given physical system (of limited volume) there is a final description upon which we can not improve any more by increasing the precision of measurements. The possibility that different local physical systems are described by different models of the "theory of everything" and that there is an inexhaustible plentitude of such models can not be excluded a priori. We will discuss this point in more detail at the end of the next section.
Some warnings aiming at possible misunderstandings are in order, here. Since we required that the models of the final theory can not be described in a single closed form, we can not identify these with the usual initial conditions of a physical theory. Also, we can not identify the models with the different possibilities for Calabi-Yau compactification which arise in string theory. The full background independent formulation of string theory one hopes to discover should live on the full moduli space and therefore is not supposed to be parametrized by different Calabi-Yau manifolds. How should the different models arise, then? We will meet a natural candidate for the price one has to pay for the universality of the "theory of everything" in the next section.
Is string theory quantum computational?
Recent research has lead to the following two -partly conjectural -scenarios:
• The tangential structure of the moduli space (to be more precise, the so called extended moduli space) of string theory at a Calabi-Yau manifold W is described by the total Hochschild complex of the sheaf of holomorphic functions on W ([Kon 1994], [Wit] ).
• The possible deformation quantizations of a smooth finite dimensional manifold M constitute an infinite dimensional manifold DM and the Grothendieck-Teichmüller group acts transitively on DM ([Kon 1999]).
At first sight, the two points may appear as completely unrelated. But the second one is deeply tied to the Deligne conjecture (a proof of which is announced in [Kon 1999]) which states that the operad of chains of the little discs operad naturally acts on the total Hochschild complex of any associative algebra (and using a deep result of cohomology theory, the so called Cohomology Comparison Theorem of [GeSch] , therefore also on the total Hochschild complex of any sheaf of associative algebras). Now, the automorphism group of the operad of chains of the little discs operad is -at least in considerations up to homotopy -the Grothendieck-Teichmüller group. The generality of the Deligne conjecture suggests, then, that the Grothendieck-Teichmüller group might also describe a fundamental symmetry of the (extended) mduli space of string theory. We present a more detailed discussion of these issues elsewhere and for our present purpose restrict to the remark that the idea that the Grothendieck-Teichmüller group could represent some fundamental symmetry of string theory gets further support from the fact that the Kontsevich formula for the deformation quantization of a finite dimensional Poisson manifold M can be derived from a two dimensional conformal field theory with target space M (see [CF] , [Kon 1997]) . The weights of the Feynman graphs of this two dimensional quantum field theory belong to a subalgebra P Z,T ate of the algebra P of periods (the notation indicating that it is the algebra of periods of certain mixed Tate motives). Again, it is conjectured ([Kon 1999]) that -roughly speaking -the symmetries of P Z,T ate are described by the Grothendieck-Teichmüller group (much the same way as the symmetries of the algebraic numbers Q are described by the absolute Galois group Gal Q/Q ).
The reader who is not acquainted with part of the technical notions used above should at least keep in mind the following two points for the discussion in the rest of this section:
• There is an algebra P Z,T ate ⊆ C over Q which is conjectured to determine the Grothendieck-Teichmüller group which in turn might be a fundamental symmetry of string theory.
• The elements of P Z,T ate appear (as the weights of Feynman graphs) in the deformation quantization of any finite dimensional Poisson manifold.
Let us speculatively suppose for the rest of this paper that the GrothendieckTeichmüller group is a fundamental symmetry of string theory. We could then -in a still more optimistic vein -hope that -as in the case of other physical theories, e.g. general relativity -the symmetry is linked to a basic principle which largely determines the theory. Is there a candidate for a physical principle which determines the algebra P Z,T ate ?
Let us try to give an answer by posing a seemingly quite different question: What is the physically natural choice for an algebra of numbers? Since a computer is a physical device, certainly all numbers which have a realization on a computer have to be considered as physical. The rationals Q can be realized on computers and since the operations of arithmetic have a realization, it is clear that the set of "physical numbers" has to be an algebra over Q. For a classical Turing machine (the model of a universal computer), Q is already the maximal set of numbers we can obtain. Even a simple non rational algebraic number like √ 2 has no intrinsic realization on a Turing machine. Since we know that nature is not classical but quantum mechanical, we should actually not consider classical Turing machines but quantum computers. The rationals can, of course, be realized there, too, and at first sight it seems that this is the final answer, again. Concerning the question of principal computability, quantum computers are equivalent to classical Turing machines, they only differ from them with respect to computational complexity of problems (see [Deu] ). But the Kontsevich quantization formula shows that there is a set of numbers -which is precisely given by the algebra P Z,T ate -which is intrinsically defined for any deformation quantization of a Poisson manifold (finite dimensional). So, if we assume a quantum computer to be described by deformation quantization of some classical model, for a quantum computer P Z,T ate should be the algebra of numbers which are physically defined (Of course, assuming that there is a model for quantum computation which can be described in terms of deformation quantization is a true -i.e. non trivial -assumption which we will make in the sequel. It is closely related to assuming that quantum computation can be described by a low dimensional quantum field theory, cf. the work of [FLW] ). Why is there no contradiction to the results of [Deu] , here? The answer is that in the quantum computer only the rationals can naturally be realized, as in the case of the classical Turing machine. The way the periods in P Z,T ate arise in the process of quantization -as weights of Feynman graphs -shows that they should be viewed as being linked to a kind of scattering theory done on the system under consideration. Scattering theory means testing the long time behaviour of a system under possible input data. So, we expect that the numbers in P Z,T ate become only observable as intrinsic numbers of a quan-tum computer when one tests the long term behaviour of the device with all possible kinds of input data. Then they should emerge from the statistics of these tests. Formulated in a down to earth way, one could say that the numbers in P Z,T ate should emerge as statistical coefficients from quantum software testing (there are no intrinsic coefficients of this kind in the classical case). In the language of formal logic these coefficients belong to the meta level (since they refer to testing the device from the outside) and not to the system itself. This is the reason why there is no contradiction to [Deu] . But testing a device is in every respect an allowed physical procedure, too. So, a quantum computer should give the much larger algebra P Z,T ate as the algebra of physically realized numbers.
In conclusion, let us suggest the following physical principle for determining the algebra P Z,T ate :
1. All physical systems should be amenable to a real time simulation on a quantum computer and quantum computers should be described as physical systems by deformation quantization of classical Turing machines.
2. The observable quantities of the world should be those which can be determined by observation of quantum computers on quantum computers.
The first part of this principle is quite close to a quantum version of the Church-Turing hypothesis as discussed in [Deu] . The real time simulation of quantum systems on a quantum computer is possible for systems with a finite dimensional quantum state space (i.e. for spin systems). The Bekenstein bound on the entropy of systems of finite volume suggests that on a fundamental level local physics should always be describable by systems with finite dimensional quantum state spaces. There are indications that this is true for string theory (see [Sus] ). We added the requirement that a quantum computer is described by deformation quantization of a classical Turing machine because this is, of course, decisive for our arguments.
Part (1) of the principle means that we can in our mind replace the whole world by a world consisting of quantum computers, only, without changing the physical properties. The assumption of part (2) is quite natural, then. It means that we should take this world of quantum computers at face value and should consider only what quantum computers can determine internally and externally (about each other) as physically observable.
Part (1) leads -as discussed above -to the algebra P Z,T ate . What is the effect of part (2)? We discussed the testing of quantum software as if done by a classical agent. Part (2) would require to do the testing by a quantum computer, too. But then the classical weights would have to be replaced by operators themselves and, in effect, we would expect an algebra of quantum periods and a q-deformation of the Grothendieck-Teichmüller group (instead of P Z,T ate and the classical Grothendieck-Teichmüller group) to arise as the fundamental symmetry objects. The (extended) moduli space of string theory, we discussed at the beginning of this section, is a space of classical backgrounds for string theory (this is like considering the Ricci flat metrics as backgrounds for perturbation expansions in general relativity). The full quantum theory will have to include non classical backgrounds, too. We are not going more deeply into this question, here, but it will be discussed in a forthcoming separate publication where we will give technical arguments why one should, indeed, expect the inclusion of non classical backgrounds to lead to quantum deformations of P Z,T ate and the Grothendieck-Teichmüller group.
But part (2) of the suggested principle has even more radical consequences. We can, in principle, imagine a quantum computer testing a quantum computer, at the same time being tested itself by yet another quantum computer, and even an iteration of this process. We would therefore have to deal with iterative deformation quantization of the mathematical structures resulting in each step. On the side of string theory this would mean that full quantized string theory would itself be only one step on a ladder of infinite quantization, an idea which has been uttered in the literature some years ago ( [Gre] ).
At this point we come back to the question of universality of string theory, discussed in the previous section. The above principle leads us to the conclusion that string theory is universal in the sense that the classical theory we have to start from is universal (represented on the mathematical side by the algebra P Z,T ate and the Grothendieck-Teichmüller group). On the other hand, there is the ladder of quantizations (on the mathematical side represented by iterated quantum deformations of classical mathematical structures). This ladder is comparable to the plentitude of models of a formal axiomatic theory since it means that there is a whole hierarchy of different "quantum realiza-tions" of the universal classical theory. This seems to be the price one has to pay for universality (comparable to the price formal axiomatics has to pay as a consequence of Gödel's incompleteness results). [GSW] .
Remark 1 One could try to find a loop hole in our arguments in the following way: When we argue that the observation of a quantum computer by a quantum computer could be observed by a third one and that this should start a ladder of quantizations, one could argue that one should actually describe the first two computers as a single quantum system observed by the third one. But this is only true if we neglect interactions or if interactions are described approximately in a way (like by a Coulomb law) which still allows for the application of the rules of simple quantum mechanics. We know that on a more fundamental level interactions have to be described by quantum field theories and then a ladder of quantizations arises (as we all know from second quantization). One should keep in mind that the "testing of quantum software" necessarily introduces a decisive interaction -without which the full algebra P Z,T ate would not be observable -between the devices. A short but intriguing discussion how the introduction of interactions starts the ladder of quantizations can be found in the introductory chapter of the first volume of

Remark 2
We mentioned an iterative application of q-deformation, above. For a concrete example -a quantum deformation of quantum groups -the reader may consult [GS] .
When discussing physical measurements in the previous section, we remarked already that the different models -i.e. the different levels of quantization -of the "theory of everything" can only be realized in terms of different local physical systems. Observing a higher level of quantization means that we have to have the possibility to observe a tower of ever smaller (quantum) effects on a system. Let us recall once again that the limit to this we found in the previous section does apply only to every single system. It does not exclude the possibility that we can observe a level of quantization which is non observable for one system by going to another one. A system which allows for the observation of a larger part of the hierarchy of quantizations has to be capable to provide more information. Since this information can not be gained -as we have seen in the previous section -by increasing the accuracy of position measurements, there is only one possibility to provide this information: The system has to be more complex. We therefore conclude that if the hierarchy of quantizations is observable it has to correspond to a hierarchy of complexity. The different models of the universal theory should correspond to different levels of complexity of physical systems.
The above principle and the work of [Gre] suggest -if one asks for the observability of the ladder of quantizations -the following view on string theory: The universality of the classical theory seems to reflect the fact that it is a theory of all the fundamental forces and particles (and thus the constituents of all kinds of matter), i.e. a "theory of everything". But it does not seem to be a reductionist theory in the strict sense since there seems to be a hierarchy of complexity corresponding to different levels of quantization. For each level of complexity there would be a limit on the information we can obtain from the system, i.e. we could observe the level of quantization up to an n-th one but the k-th level for k ≥ n would be physically unobservable. One suspects that on the level of elementary particle physics it is just the usual quantization of a physical theory which is observable with all the rest of the ladder being non observable.
Remark 3 We can not circumvent the levels of complexity by arguing that the system just consists of elementary constituents. It is not a priori clear that we can completely break apart the system in this way. In a theory involving a ladder of quantizations there is no a priori rule which tells us that
we have to apply the same level of quantization to the composed system as to the constituents. We expect that when a system becomes complex enough to do an amount of "quantum software testing" which makes the algebra P Z,T ate observable to it, the critical point for the next level of complexity (or quantization) is reached.
Concluding this section, we mention once again that interactions (the "quantum software testing") are inextricably linked to each passage to the next higher level of quantization. In a theory following the suggested principle, a "cat", belonging to a level of complexity which is at least one step higher than the one of elementary particles and atoms, could therefore never become a "Schrödinger's cat" by an experiment triggered by radioactive decay (following the rules of quantum mechanics, it is not decisive for the "cat" actually to do "quantum software testing" on atoms but what matters is only the possibility that it is, by information capacity, able to do it).
Conclusion
We have seen that there are strong arguments that string theory should have the property of being the final physical theory but there may be a price for this universality to pay in the form of a ladder of quantizations (corresponding to a hierarchy of complexity). A possible fundamental symmetry of string theory and the ladder of quantizations may both be consequences of an underlying principle with a natural quantum computational formulation. A paper dealing with some of the more technical aspects, mentioned only shortly, here, will appear separately.
If the picture presented in this paper has anything to do with the true nature of string theory, string theory would be both, an end and a beginning. Since the days of antiquity human scientists and philosophers have asked questions about space, time, and the ultimate constituents of matter. String theory would be the final word about this, the end of a long journey of investigation. But at the same time, it would be a new beginning, the starting point of a physics asking questions about a quantum hierarchy of complexity and about properties of quantum computation.
We have formulated our suggested principle in the language of quantum computers because with quantum mechanics having become one of the standard parts of modern mathematical physics, this should be an especially intelligible form. But beyond the questions discussed in this article, the work of Kontsevich (in [Kon 1997] , [Kon 1999] ) could -in an optimistic vein, once again -turn out to be the starting point for a new understanding of quantization, itself. The decisive question is if the universal infinite dimensional manifold DM of deformation quantizations of a finite dimensional manifold M, as discussed in [Kon 1999] , can be determined by knowing that it is a principal homogenous space of the Grothendieck-Teichmüller group plus some natural principles. Put into different words: The question is if the Grothendieck-Teichmüller group (and therefore -under the assumption of a conjecture of [Kon 1999 ] -the algebra P Z,T ate ) does -modulo some natural principles -already determine what deformation quantization is. If the answer to this question would be in the affirmative, this would mean that quantization itself would be largely determined by two simple yet deep principles. In the rest of this appendix we will explain this idea in more detail, assuming speculatively, again, that the answer to the above questions is indeed in the affirmative (i.e. the important step remaining would be to determine the algebra P Z,T ate , again).
We state the first of the two principles as:
The physically relevant information of a state space of a physical theory is fully contained in a suitable algebra of real valued functions (observables) on state space and the deformation theory of this algebra.
The first part of this principle -physically relevant information is contained in the algebra of observables on state space -is definitely true for all the well established theories in physics. The second part -the inclusion of the deformation theory of the algebra -can, of course, be justified on abstract grounds: Why should a highly idealized mathematical structurelike some algebra -be exactly applicable to physics? One would expect that algebras which are in some sense close to the original one should also be of relevance, then. But this means precisely the consideration of deformation theory of algebras. In string theory we indeed consider the moduli space of two dimensional conformal quantum field theories as the space of physically allowed classical backgrounds of the theory. So, this principle is just a destilation of the structural core we anyway accept for physical theories.
Let us come to the second principle, now:
Principle 2
The physically fundamental description of a Turing machine should have an inherent definition for any numerical quantity which is of physical relevance and can be explicitly defined (be it in arithmetic or geometric terms).
Remember that the concept of a Turing machine, though a purely mathematical concept on first sight, has a physical ingredient. In its classical form the concept implicitly assumes that the machine is working according to the rules of classical mechanics (as was pointed out by Deutsch in [Deu] ). But -as we know definitely to be true nowdays from the existence of quantum computers (though still very small in terms of bits, they exist) -this, indeed, need not be the case and there are different, physically more fundamental, concepts of a Turing machine than the classical one. Principle 2 assumes that on a fundamental level everything is accessible to (the corresponding notion of) digital computers, there are no phenomena which are fundamentally of an "analog" nature (to stress it once again, the principle does in no way imply that this should hold for classical Turing machines).
We can immediately see that a classical Turing machine does not satisfy Principle 2 because only the rational numbers Q are inherently defined quantities for a classical Turing machine. But as the Pythagoreans observed already, there are other numbers like √ 2 which can equally well be explicitly defined (e.g. as representing the diagonal in a square of unit length). It is not important that by the atomistic nature of matter no true diagonals of true squares can be built. In all the physical theories known so far such geometric constructs still appear on a more abstract level (e.g. in the setting of state space). E.g. √ 2 can also be defined via normalization of an equal probability superposition of two quantum states. So, we do not escape these quantities by refering to atomism.
All algebraic numbers Q have an explicit definition (either one refers to the corresponding algebraic equation or to a geometrical construction) but still this is not sufficient. Volumes of explicitly defined geometrical figures are also quantities we should include. Since -by the foregoing considerations -we should consider a geometrical figure to be explicitly defined if its boundaries can be defined in algebraic terms, this means that we should include integrals over algebraic functions on algebraic domains. But if one puts this into precise mathematical terms it means that periods should have an inherent definition in fundamental computing devices.
We should remember at this point that we have to apply Principle 1, too. Assuming the validity of the partly conjectural scenario of [Kon 1999] (which includes especially the Deligne conjecture), it seems that only the periods belonging to the algebra P Z,T ate are linked to the deformation theory of associative algebras. So, both principles taken together do indeed suggest the algebra P Z,T ate as the algebra of numbers which a physically fundamental Turing machine should have an inherent definition of.
We are done then in suggesting a way how to define a quantum computer from first principles without presupposing quantum mechanics from the start. We could use this definition of a "fundamental Turing machine" now to go back and reformulate the principle suggested above for string theory by replacing the notion of a quantum computer by that of a "fundamental Turing machine" (if one wants to have an equivalent formulation of this principle which does not presuppose any conventional knowledge of quantization).
What does such an approach to quantization mean? It means that one tries to understand quantization itself as being largely determined by a computability requirement. We try to pass from simply observing the fact that nature is intelligible ("the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences" which nowdays can be refined to the statement of an unreasonable effectiveness of computer simulation) to turning this observation into a fundamental physical principle. Only detailed future investigations of the mathematical structures arising can lead to a judgement if such an approach has a chance to lead to correct physics.
